The Journalist\u27s Privilege: Ensuring that Compelled Disclosure Is the Exception, Not the Rule - Shoen v. Shoen by Baum, Kevin J.
Volume 3 Issue 2 Article 8 
1996 
The Journalist's Privilege: Ensuring that Compelled Disclosure Is 
the Exception, Not the Rule - Shoen v. Shoen 
Kevin J. Baum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin J. Baum, The Journalist's Privilege: Ensuring that Compelled Disclosure Is the Exception, Not the 
Rule - Shoen v. Shoen, 3 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J. 557 (1996). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol3/iss2/8 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
Casenotes
THE JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE: ENSURING THAT




A general legal principle states that the "public ... has a right
to every man's evidence."1 The United States Congress adhered to
this maxim in promulgating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which allow a party to "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action. '2 In Hickman v. Taylor,3 the United States Supreme
1. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting JOHN H. Wic-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)). This quotation is attributed
to Lord Hardwicke. Carl C. Monk, Evidentiary Privilege for Journalists' Sources: Theory
and Statutory Protection, 51 Mo. L. REV. 2, 2 n.1 (1986). Lord Hardwicke made this
famous and often quoted statement on May 25, 1742 during a debate in the House
of Lords. Id.
2. FED. R_ Crv. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Additionally, Rule 26(b)(1)
states that the "information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the infor-
mation sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence." Id. (emphasis added). A party, however, is not automatically entitled to
obtain discovery of "any matter" when there is a converse claim of privilege. See id.
After the 1946 amendment to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes state that "the purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for
facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the
preparation or presentation of his case." Ugo Colella, HIV-Related Information and
the Tension Between Confidentiality and Liberal Discovery, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 33, 63
(1995) (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 26 advisory committee's note).
In determining whether a privilege exists, or in examining the extent of a
privilege, federal courts look to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Peter A.
Gish, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and Environmental Audit Reports, 25 ENvrL. L.
73, 77 (1995). Rule 501 provides that:
[e]xcept as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in the rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, goy-
ernment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in ac-
cordance with State law.
FED. R. Evm. 501 (emphasis added). In 1973, the United States Supreme Court
addressed evidentiary privileges and stated that "these exceptions to the demand
(557)
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Court held that the rules governing discovery are accorded broad
and liberal treatment. 4 However, a "broad and liberal" discovery
process can, and often does, come into direct conflict with the First
Amendment's Freedom of the Press Clause.5 Journalists, reporters
and other newsgatherers often claim a qualified First Amendment
privilege against disclosure when faced with a court order to pro-
duce material and/or the names of sources during a judicial or in-
vestigatory proceeding. 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed the conflict between the First Amendment and the "broad
and liberal" discovery process in Shoen v. Shoen (Shoen I/).7 In Shoen
II, the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment freedom of the
for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they
are in derogation of the search for truth." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
710 (1974).
3. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
4. Id. at 507. The Court stated that "[miutual knowledge of all relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation." Id. Additionally, the
Court held that when discovery is conducted in a broad and liberal manner, a
party may not argue against "fishing expedition" type request due to "the idea that
discovery is mutual-that while a party may have to disclose his case, he can at the
same time tie his opponent down to a definite position." Id. at 507 & n.8 (quoting
James A. Pike & John W. Willis, Federal Discoveiy in Operation, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 297,
303 (1940)). Although a party may be required to provide valuable information to
the opposing counsel, the same party may itself receive valuable information, in
return, from the opposing party.
5. The First Amendment provides in part that: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See generally MuRL A. LARKIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 8.01, at 8-5
to 8-19 (1995) (explaining scope, limitations and procedures of journalist's privi-
lege). The basis for the journalist's First Amendment privilege is to preserve the
"free flow of information." Kraig L. Baker, Are Oliver Stone and Tom ClancyJournal-
ists? Determining Who Has Standing to Claim the Journalist's Privilege, 69 WASH. L. REV.
739, 741 (1994). For a further discussion of the historical creation and application
of the journalist's qualified First Amendment privilege against disclosure, see infra
notes 15-63 and accompanying text.
Courts of the United States recognize other privileges against compelled dis-
closure, such as the attorney-client privilege, the clergy-parishioner privilege, the
physician-patient privilege and the spousal privilege. GLEN WEISSENBERGER, WEIS-
SENBERGER'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 501.5 to 501.8 (1995). However, the Supreme
Court noted in United States v. Nixon that "courts have historically been cautious
about privileges." Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 n.18. The Court asserted that the use of a
privilege is proper when there is a "public good transcending the normally pre-
dominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth." Id.
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing)). Additionally, the interest protected by such a privilege must be "of sufficient
social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in
the administration of justice." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 183 (1979) (quot-
ing CHARLEs T. McCoRmIcK, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 152 (Edward W. Cleary ed.,
2d ed. 1972)).
7. 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995).
[Vol. III: p. 557
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press clause provided third party journalists with a qualified privi-
lege against disclosure of nonconfidential information and materi-
als during a civil trial.8 The court created a three-part test to
determine whether a civil litigant is entitled to discover a third party
journalist's nonconfidential material when the journalist seeks pro-
tection under the First Amendment. 9
This Note focuses on the Ninth Circuit's newly created three-
part test for overcoming the journalist's privilege. As background,
section II of this Note examines the creation and continuing evolu-
tion of the journalist's qualified First Amendment privilege against
disclosure. 10 Section III of this Note recounts the factual founda-
tion surrounding the Shoen Ildecision. 11 Additionally, section IV of
this Note discusses and evaluates the Ninth Circuit's holding and its
creation of the Shoen II three-part test.12 Section V of this Note as-
sesses the impact of the Shoen II decision on the application of the
journalist's qualified First Amendment privilege and the extent to
which other courts are likely to adopt the Shoen II three-part test.1 3
This Note concludes that the Ninth Circuit's three-part test pro-
vides a viable option for other courts to use in determining whether
to overcome the journalist's privilege.1 4
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Creation of the Journalist's Qualified Privilege
At common law, courts of the United States did not recognize
a privilege permitting journalists to refuse to disclose their confi-
dential sources or information acquired during the newsgathering
process. 15 In Garland v. Torte,16 a journalist refused to disclose the
8. Id. at 416-18. For a discussion of the Siwen II holding, see infra notes 83-
142 and accompanying text.
9. Id. at 416. For a discussion of the S/oen II three-part test, see infra notes 88-
98 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the creation and the continuing evolution of the jour-
nalist's privilege under the First Amendment, see infra notes 15-63 and accompa-
nying text.
11. For a discussion of the factual and procedural history of Shoen II, see infra
notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
12. For a narrative and critical analysis of Shoen II, see infra notes 83-132 and
accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the impact of Shoen II, see infra notes 133-42 and ac-
companying text.
14. See infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
15. LARMN, supra note 6, at 8-1. See also Timothy L. Alger, Promises Not To Be
Kept: The Illusory Newsgatherer's Privilege in California, 25 Loy. LA. L. REv. 155, 169
(1991) (stating that "common law refused to recognize reporters' claims of privi-
lege"); Monk, supra note 1, at 18 ("All of the early American cases refused to recog-
19961
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identifies of her confidential sources. 17 The Garland case marked
the first time that a journalist claimed protection from disclosure
under the First Amendment.18 In upholding the contempt order
against the journalist, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that freedom of the press is a qualified privi-
nize a reporter's privilege, either under common law, or any of the other
theoretical bases asserted."); Leslie A. Warren, A Critique of an Illegal Conduct Limita-
tion on the Reporter's Privilege Not to Testify, 46 FED. COMM. LJ. 549, 553 (1994) (stat-
ing that "federal courts have historically rejected a common law privilege
protecting journalists from revealing information"). However, other scholars note
that "[s] ome judges .. . refused to compel disclosure . . . [while] others .. .im-
posed remarkably weak penalties for those who failed to comply. We are, there-
fore, left with the anomaly of the common law. Judges expressly rejected a
reporter's privilege, yet when faced with refusal to divulge information, those same
judges exercised great leniency." Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of
the Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARiz. L.
REv. 815, 820 (1983).
Commentators often highlight a situation involving Benjamin Franklin's
brother to demonstrate the historical rejection of the journalist's privilege. Baker,
supra note 6, at 740 (citing Marcus, supra, at 817). In 1772, after being offended
by an article appearing in a local newspaper, the legislature requested Franklin's
brother, a newspaper employee, to appear before a committee. Id. The legislature
imprisoned Franklin's brother for one month when he refused to disclose the au-
thor of the offensive article. Id. SeeAlger, supra, at 169 n.76; Vince Blasi, The News-
man's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 229 n.1 (1971) (quoting
THE AUToBIOGRAPI-Y OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 69 (Leonard W. Labaree et al. eds,
1964)). For other examples of early common law cases dealing with the journal-
ist's privilege, see Marcus, supra, at 817-18 nn.23, 25-30.
Dean John H. Wigmore, a preeminent legal scholar, argued against the ac-
ceptance of a journalist's privilege, and other professional privileges, because "it
[had] not been demonstrated 'that the occasional disclosure, in judicial proceed-
ings, of the communication sought to be kept secret would be injurious to the
general exercise of the occupation.'" Monk, supra note 1, at 3-4 (quotingJOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAw § 2286, at 532 (1961)). When
describing the Maryland press shield law, Dean Wigmore remarked that it was" 'as
detestable in substance as it is crude in form.' " John W. Zucker, The Journalist's
Privilege, in TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 8-16 (Scott N. Stone & Ronald S. Leibman eds.,
1993) (quotingJoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAw § 2286 n.7
(1961)). For a further discussion of state shield laws, see id. at 8-16 to 8-22; see also
infra note 31.
16. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
17. Id. at 547. In Garland, Judy Garland, a well known actress, brought an
action against CBS for making allegedly defamatory statements, and then later au-
thorizing, the publication of the statements in the print media. Id. Marie Torre
wrote an article containing the allegedly defamatory statements, in which she at-
tributed the statements to an unnamed CBS executive. Id. During pretrial discov-
ery, Garland's attorneys deposed Torre concerning her article. Id. When
Garland's attorney asked Torre which CBS executive provided the statements, she
refused to answer. Id. The district court held Torre in contempt after she refused
to name the source under a court order. Id. Before the Second Circuit, Torre
argued that disclosure would "encroach upon the freedom of the press guaranteed
by the First Amendment, because 'it would impose an important practical restraint
on the flow of news from news sources to news media and would thus diminish pro
tanto the flow of news to the public.'" Id. at 547-48.
18. Monk, supra note 1, at 18.
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lege, not an absolute privilege 1 9 The court stated that it must
therefore determine "whether the interest to be served by compel-
ling the testimony . . . justifies some impairment of this First
Amendment freedom."20
Fourteen years later, in Branzburg v. Hayes,21 the Supreme
Court addressed whether the First Amendment provided journalists
with a privilege against disclosure of sources during a grand jury
proceeding. 22 The majority opinion, signed by five Justices, 23 held
19. Garland, 259 F.2d at 548.
20. Id. Judge Stewart, the author of the Garland opinion, stated that forced
disclosure of such information might infringe upon the freedom of the press by
restricting the accessibility of news. Id. Some commentators consider the Garland
decision to be the foundation for the journalist's First Amendment privilege.
Zucker, supra note 15, at 8-4. This is likely the result ofJudge Stewart's references
to relevance, materiality and whether the "question asked.. . went to the heart of
the plaintiff's claim." Garland, 259 F.2d at 549-50. Subsequent courts have consid-
ered Garland to be the groundwork for the balancing test standard to determine
whether a journalist must reveal his or her sources and information. Monk, supra
note 1, at 18. For a further discussion of the application of case-by-case balancing
tests, see infra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
21. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
22. Id. at 667. In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court consolidated four
cases. Id. at 667, 672, 675. In the first case, Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345
(Ky. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), a newspaper
reporter wrote a story for the Courier-Journal of Louisville, Kentucky describing the
drug activities of two individuals. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 667. The news-
paper reporter promised the two individuals that he would not reveal their identi-
ties. Id. at 667-68. 'The grand jury of Jefferson County subpoenaed the reporter
concerning his research for the article, but when he appeared before the grand
jury he refused to identify the two sources of his article. Id. at 668. The trial judge
then ordered the reporter to identify his sources. Id. The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals upheld the trial judge's disclosure order. Id. at 668-69.
The second case, Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971), aff'd sub
nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), involved the same reporter, but in
this situation he wrote an article concerning drug use in Frankfort, Kentucky.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 669. For his article, the reporter interviewed many
drug users and observed them using drugs. Id. The Franklin County grand jury
subpoenaed the reporter to testify about drug use and the sale of drugs within
Franklin County. Id. (quoting record without citation). When the reporter moved
to quash the summons, the court ordered him to "'answer any questions which
concern or pertain to any criminal act, the commission of which was actually ob-
served by [him].'" Id. at 670 (alteration in original) (quoting record without cita-
tion). The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's order requiring
disclosure. Id. at 670-71.
The third case, In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), aff'd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), involved a television newsman-photogra-
pher who chronicled the Black Panthers in New Bedford, Massachusetts.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 672. During a riot in New Bedford on July 30,
1970, the reporter attended a meeting at the Black Panthers' headquarters. Id.
The Bristol County grand jury summoned the reporter and asked him to testify
about the Black Panthers' activities during the riot. Id. at 672-73. The reporter
sought protection under the First Amendment. Id. at 673. The trial judge ruled
that a constitutional privilege against disclosure of sources before a grand jury did
not exist. Id. The Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court affirmed the trial judge's
19961
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that courts may not provide newsgatherers with a privilege to with-
hold their sources during a grand jury proceeding conducted in
good faith.2 4
The positions of the dissenting Justices along with Justice Pow-
ell, in his concurring opinion, have been interpreted to contend
"that reporters may have at least a qualified privilege not to testify
about their sources." 25
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that "[t]he as-
serted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking
of a prper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation
of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal
decision and rejected the reporter's appeal. Id. at 674. The court held that
" '[t]he obligation of newsmen . . . is that of every citizen . . . to appear when
summoned, with relevant written or other material when required, and to answer
relevant and reasonable questions.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In rePap-
pas, 266 N.E.2d at 302-03).
Finally, the case of United States v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970),
rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), involved a reporter who
covered the Black Panthers for the New York Times. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at
675. A grand jury served a subpoena duces tecum on the reporter. Id. A sub-
poena duces tecum is a "court process... compelling production of certain spe-
cific documents and other items, material and relevant to facts in issue in a
pending judicial proceeding, which documents and items are in custody and con-
trol of person or body served with the process." BLAcK's LAw DiCrIONARY 1426
(6th ed. 1990). The reporter was to appear before the grand jury and provide
.notes and tape recordings of interviews." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 675 &
n.12. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that a qualified testimonial privilege al-
lowed reporters to withhold information absent a "special showing of necessity by
the Government" due to the "potential impact of such [a disclosure] on the flow of
news to the public." Id. at 679.
23. Justice White wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
665. Justice Powell filed an additional concurring opinion. Id.
24. Id. at 690-709. However, the Court recognized that protections for news-
gathering did exist. Id. at 681. Furthermore, the Court stated that its opinion did
not suggest "that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection;
without some protection for seeking out news, freedom of the press could be evis-
cerated." Id. However, the Court held that there was
no basis for holding that. the public interest in law enforcement and in
ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the
consequentia but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result
from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant ques-
tions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or crim-
inal trial.
Id. at 690-91 (emphasis added).
25. Warren, supra note 15, at 555 (emphasis added). The four dissentingJus-
tices included Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan and Marshall. Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 665. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
rejected this interpretation in In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th
Cir. 1987). For a further discussion of In re GrandJuiy Proceeding, see infra note 32
and accompanying text.
[Vol. III: p. 557
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conduct."2 6 Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Stewart stated that
"[t]he reporter's constitutional right to a confidential relationship
with his sources stems from the broad societal interest in a full and
free flow of information to the public."27 Justice Stewart's dissent
also proposed a three-part test for overcoming the reporter's privi-
lege against disclosure of sources.28 Justice Stewart stated that:
the government must (1) show that there is probable
cause to believe that the newsman has information that is
clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2)
demonstrate that the information sought cannot be ob-
tained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling
and overriding interest in the information.2 9
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas remarked that a journal-
ist should always be entitled to an absolute privilege against disclo-
sure of confidential sources of information.30
26. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell,J., concurring) (emphasis added). In
addition, Justice Powell stated that journalists are not left without protection in
situations where there is a bad faith investigation, where the requested information
bears "only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation"
or where the government does not have a legitimate need for the requested infor-
mation. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's reference to a "remote and
tenuous" relationship lends support to the heightened relevancy requirement in
formal tests to determine the strength of the journalist's privilege. Zucker, supra
note 15, at 8-51 to 8-52.
27. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). According to Justice
Stewart, society's interest in receiving information was the underlying concern of
the Constitution's free press protection. Id. at 725-26 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Grosjean v. Ameri-
can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)). Justices Brennan and Douglas joined
Justice Stewart's dissent. Id.
28. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
29. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's three-part test is strikingly
similar to the test proposed by the individuals who sought the protection of the
journalist's privilege in Branzburg. Monk, supra note 1, at 24 & n.112 (quoting
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680)).
30. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 711-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
stated in his dissent that "[i]t is my view that there is no 'compelling need' that can
be shown which qualifies the reporter's immunity from appearing or testifying
before a grand jury, unless the reporter himself is implicated in a crime. His immu-
nity in my view is therefore quite complete." Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added). For an extensive discussion of Branzburg, see generally Monica Langley
& Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources and First Amendment Values,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 13 (1988); Donna M. Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege:
Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. Rxv. 829 (1974).
1996]
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B. The Post-Branzburg Application of the Journalist's Qualified
First Amendment Privilege
1. The Balancing Standard
A majority of federal courts interpret the Branzburg decision
as creating a qualified First Amendment privilege for journalists
against compelled disclosure. 3' The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit
to specifically reject the journalist's qualified privilege. 32 Two fed-
31. Shoen v. Shoen (Shoen 1), 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993). For a further
discussion of Shoen I, see infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
Dean Carl C. Monk stated that "Branzburg, with its amalgam of opinions, has
become the cornerstone of what is today the widely-recognized qualified constitu-
tional privilege of a newsperson not to reveal confidential sources." Monk, supra
note 1, at 19. (footnote omitted). Immediately following Branzburg, federal courts
"quickly gave notice that the Supreme Court's decision had not been the death
knell for the journalist's First Amendment privilege that it might have seemed."
Zucker, supra note 15, at 8-12 (discussing Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th
Cir. 1972); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973)). But see Baker, supra note 6, at 747 (asserting "[i]mmediately
following Branzburg, many judges and commentators felt that a journalist's privi-
lege had been completely rejected").
Nine circuits have established a qualified First Amendment privilege for jour-
nalists against compelled disclosure. Shoen , 5 F.3d at 1292. See LaRouche v. NBC,
780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); United States v.
Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Zerilli v. Smith,
656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper
Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595-96 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d
139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); Miller v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977); Farr v. Pitch-
ess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976);
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973).
Additionally, the Supreme Court acknowledged that individual states could
create their own degree of protection for journalists. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706
(stating "we are powerless to bar state courts from ... construing their own consti-
tutions so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute").
Presently, a large majority of states recognize a journalist's privilege, either judi-
cially or legislatively. Alger, supra note 15, at 157-58 & nn.10-11. See also Zucker,
supra note 15, at 8-16 (stating that "28 states and the District of Columbia had
enacted some form of shield law"). In the mid-1970s, Congress attempted, and
subsequently failed, to amend Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by enumerat-
ing eleven specific privileges. 120 CONG. REc. H40891 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)
(statement of Rep. Hungate). Although Congress did not include the journalist's
privilege within this proposed rule, Representative Hungate stated that "[t] he lan-
guage cannot be interpreted as a congressional expression in favor of having no
such privilege, nor can the conference action be interpreted as denying to newspe-
ople any protection they may have from State newsperson's privilege law." Id.
32. Shoen 1, 5 F.3d at 1292 n.5 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d
580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1987)). In In re Grand Juy Proceedings, a group of gang mem-
bers disclosed, during a videotaped interview, that a member of their gang mur-
dered a local police officer. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 583 (6th
Cir. 1987). To assure the gang's cooperation during future interviews, the re-
8
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eral appellate courts, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, have not
yet addressed whether Branzburg created a journalist's qualified
privilege.33
The Ninth Circuit, in Farr v. Pitchess,34 became the first federal
appellate court to "formally recognize a qualified privilege" for
journalists3 5 In Farr, a California state court held a newspaper re-
porter in contempt for failing to identify the sources of statements
used in an article he authored.36 The reporter claimed that the
porter agreed not to disclose any footage showing the member's faces. Id. at 582.
A Michigan grand jury served a subpoena duces tecum on the television reporter
requesting that the reporter produce 60 seconds of film footage containing the
faces of gang members. Id. at 581-83.
The court held the reporter in civil contempt after he refused to produce the
materials. Id. at 583. The Sixth Circuit stayed the reporter's incarceration pend-
ing disposition of the appeal, but it rejected the reporter's claim for First Amend-
ment protection. Id. at 583-84. The court held that Branzburg did not establish a
qualified privilege, because "acceptance of [that] position ...would be tanta-
mount to our substituting, as the holding of Branzburg, the dissent written byJus-
tice Stewart (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) for the majority opinion."
Id. at 584. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit refused to accept the "qualified privilege
balancing process urged by the three Branzburg dissenters and rejected by the ma-
jority." Id. (footnote omitted).
33. Shoen I, 5 F.3d at 1292 n.5. However, recently a state supreme court deci-
sion within the Seventh Circuit did support the use of the journalist's privilege in a
civil malpractice suit. Kurzynski v. Spaeth, 538 N.W.2d 554 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
In Kurzynski, Milwaukee Magazine published an article entitled Bone of Contention in
January of 1994. Id. at 556. The article detailed the questionable medical prac-
tices of Dr. William Faber and his associates. Id. The authors of the article inter-
viewed litigants to the pending lawsuit against the doctors. Id. Prior to the article's
publication, the doctors' attorney served a subpoena duces tecum on the authors,
seeking the production of "[a]ll documents and records pertaining in any way to
interviews... with any persons in any way related to the litigation." Id. at 556-57.
The trial court ordered the authors to produce the documents and to testify, but
the authors asserted ajournalist's privilege against such disclosure. Id. at 557. The
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin reversed the trial court's order and recognized a
qualified journalist's privilege under Branzburg. Id. at 558-59 (citing Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)). See generally Marv Balousek, Appeals Court Ruling
Reverses Order for Journalists to Turn Over Materials, Wis. ST. J., Aug. 2, 1995, at 3C
(reporting that appeals court balanced "need to insulate journalists from undue
intrusion into their news-gathering activities... [against] litigants' need for every
person's evidence").
34. 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975).
35. Baker, supra note 6, at 748. Shortly after the Supreme Court handed
down Branzburg, the Eighth Circuit recognized the evolution of a qualified privi-
lege against disclosure of confidential sources. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d
986, 992 n.9 (8th Cir. 1972). In Cervantes, a reporter refused to reveal his sources
during the pretrial discovery phase of a civil trial. Id. at 988-89. The article con-
cerned the mayor of St. Louis' ties to organized crime. Id. at 988. In affirming
summary judgment for the reporter, the Eighth Circuit held that the libel allega-
tions lacked sufficient substance to require the disclosure of confidential sources.
Id. at 990-95. See also Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 583
F. Supp. 427, 432-35 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (discussing historical advancement of jour-
nalist's privilege and applying case-by-case balancing analysis).
36. Farr, 522 F.2d at 466. A state trial judge barred the public dissemination
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First Amendment Freedom of the Press clause allowed him to re-
fuse to divulge the names of his confidential sources.3 7 On review,
the Ninth Circuit applied a balancing test,3 8 holding that "the news-
man's privilege must yield to the more important and compelling
need for disclosure."39
Subsequently, other circuits have adopted a balancing test simi-
lar to the Farr balancing test. In Riley v. City of Chester,40 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit used a balancing test
to determine that a third party newspaper reporter 4 did not have
to disclose her confidential sources during a civil trial. 42 After first
of certain prejudicial statements dealing with the Charles Manson murder trial. Id.
The judge feared that public dissemination of the statements would threaten the
viability of a fair trial. Id. Shortly after the judge's order, Farr published an article
in the Los Angeles Herald Examiner containing "full and lurid details" of the prejudi-
cial statements. Id. In the judge's chambers, Farr refused to disclose the names of
the individuals who provided him with the statements. Id. After the Manson trial
ended, the trial judge "formally ordered" Farr to defend his nondisclosure of the
sources. Id. The court held Farr in contempt and incarcerated him. Id. The
United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Farr's
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Id. Farr appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth
Circuit. Id.
37. Id. at 467. Farr claimed that he had promised the two sources confidenti-
ality in exchange for the individuals' statements. Id. In rejecting this particular
use of the journalists' privilege, the Ninth Circuit stated that it "must be accepted
factually that the ostensible purpose of the court order was to protect the right of
the Manson defendants to a fair trial, free of prejudicial publicity." Id.
38. Id. at 468. The court stated that "[t] he application of the Branzburg hold-
ing to non-grand jury cases seems to require that the claimed First Amendment
privilege and the opposing need for disclosure be judicially weighed in light of the
surrounding facts and a balance struck to determine where lies the paramount interest." Id.
(emphasis added). One commentator has argued that courts tend not to conduct
"an ad hoc balancing of particulars... but instead ... have considered whether
the moving party has demonstrated a sufficiently compelling need for the material
to overcome a presumption of protection." Zucker, supra note 15, at 8-50.
39. Farr, 522 F.2d at 469. The court held that Branzburg recognized "some
First Amendment protection of news sources." Id. at 467. However, the individu-
als who disclosed the statements to Farr "flagrantly disobeyed" the court's order.
Id. at 468. According to the court, this action "constituted a direct challenge to the
power and duty of the court to protect its processes and to guarantee due process
to the accused persons." Id. In applying the balancing test, the Ninth Circuit
stated that "the First Amendment protection announced by Branzburg collided
head on with a compelling judicial interest in disclosure of the identity of those
persons frustrating a duly entered order of the court." Id. Therefore, the court
held that the defendant's due process guarantees outweighed Farr's First Amend-
ment interests. Id. at 468-69.
40. 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979).
41. The journalist's privilege provides the greatest protection to a third party
journalist during a civil trial's discovery process. Warren, supra note 15, at 558
(citing Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broadcast Co., 583 F. Supp. 427, 433
(E.D. Mo. 1984)). See also Alger, supra note 15, at 175 (asserting that courts are
reluctant to order disclosure against nonparty journalists in civil litigation).
42. Riley, 612 F.2d at 710-13. William Riley, a Chester police officer running
for mayor in the city of Chester, filed a complaint against the mayor of Chester, the
[Vol. III: p. 557
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recognizing the existence of a qualified privilege forjournalists, the
Third Circuit adopted the balancing test set forth byJustice Powell
in his Branzburg concurring opinion.43 In United States v. Cuthbert-
son,44 the Third Circuit extended the use of the Riley balancing test
to protect unpublished materials during a criminal trial. 45 The
Chester chief of police, and other Chester employees. Id. at 710. He alleged that
they violated his constitutional right of freedom to conduct a campaign under 28
U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. He claimed that the defendants illegally
conducted performance investigations of him in his capacity as a police officer and
publicly announced the results of the investigations. Id. At a hearing on the mat-
ter, Riley's attorney called a newspaper reporter to the stand who authored an
article containing references to the Riley performance reports. Id. He asked the
reporter to reveal the source that provided Riley's performance records. Id. at 711.
Asserting her First Amendment privilege, the reporter refused to disclose her con-
fidential sources. Id. Subsequent witnesses testified that the mayor gave them the
information regarding Riley's performance records. Id. at 712-13. When the de-
fendants moved to dismiss the claims, the trial judge stated, "I will not dismiss the
complaint, not until I have heard [the reporter's] testimony." Id. at 713. The
court held the reporter in contempt for refusing to identify her sources. Id. The
reporter successfully appealed her contempt order to the Third Circuit. Id.
43. Id. at 715-16. Quoting fromJustice Powell's concurrence in Branzburg, the
Third Circuit held:
[t]he asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the strik-
ing of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation
of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.
The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case
basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concur-
ring)). Additionally, the court held that the public interest in protecting news-
gatherers' "sources and information warrants an even greater weight" in civil trials.
Id. (quoting Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 443 F.
Supp. 489, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1977)). In deciding that the contempt order needed to
be overturned, the court considered the following factors: whether the materiality,
relevance and necessity of the information was shown; whether there was an " 'ef-
fort to obtain [the information] from other sources;' " and whether the requesting
party had demonstrated his "interest in civil litigation ... is dependent upon the
information sought." Id. at 716-17 (alteration in original) (quoting Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977)). Using this balancing test,
the court decided that necessity for the information did not exist. Id. at 717. The
court held that the plaintiff failed to exhaust the most reasonable alternative
source and that the information was only marginally relevant to the plaintiff's case.
Id. at 717-18.
44. 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980).
45. Id. at 146-47. On September 5, 1979, a Newark, New Jersey grand jury
indicted several persons involved in "Wild Bill's," a family restaurant franchise, for
conspiracy and fraud. Id. at 142. Prior to the indictment, a CBS news program, 60
Minutes, broadcast a segment featuring the restaurant franchise and the ongoing
investigation by the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office into its activities. Id. Shortly
before trial, "Wild Bill's" served CBS with a subpoena duces tecum. Id. After mod-
ifying the request, the court ordered CBS to produce numerous documents and
audio tapes dealing with the 60 Minutes broadcast for in camera inspection. Id. at
143. A trial judge may order in camera inspection to "inspect a document which
counsel wishes to use at trial in his chambers before ruling on its admissibility or its
use." BLACK'S LAW DicnoNARY 760 (6th ed. 1990). CBS refused to comply with
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court found that "the lack of a confidential source may be an im-
portant element in balancing the defendant's need for the material
sought against the interest of the journalist in preventing produc-
tion in a particular case." 46
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
adopted a balancing test for non-confidential sources, materials
and information in United States v. LaRouche Campaign.47 Explain-
ing its balancing test, the court stated that First Amendment inter-
ests48 must be balanced against the defendants' interests. 49 After
applying the balancing test, the court held that the defendants' in-
this order under its First Amendment privilege. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 143. The
court held CBS in civil contempt, imposing a fine of one dollar per day. Id.
46. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 147. The Third Circuit held that a defendant's
rights in a criminal trial "are important factors that must be considered in deciding
whether... the privilege must yield to the defendant's need for the information."
Id. In Cuthbertson, however, the Third Circuit refused to formalize an approach for
determining when the journalist's privilege must yield. Id. at 148. By applying the
balancing standard, the court held that the requesting party met its burden by
showing that the information was unavailable from any other source. Id. The
Third Circuit, like the district court, ordered disclosure of the material for in cam-
era review. Id. at 148-49. Subsequently, the Third Circuit and district courts
within the Third Circuit have followed the balancing approach set forth in Riley
and Cuthbertson. See United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 357-360 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 150,
151-52 (E.D. Pa. 1994); United States v. McGoldrick, 796 F. Supp. 178, 179-80
(E.D. Pa. 1992); Parsons v. Watson, 778 F. Supp. 214, 217-19 (D. Del. 1991); In re
Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358, 367-69 (W.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd, 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir.
1992).
47. 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988). Lyndon H. LaRouche, a 1984 presidential
candidate, along with "The LaRouche Campaign," and 17 other individuals and
entities were indicted for mail fraud, wire fraud and for conspiracy to obstruct
justice. Id. at 1177. All of the charges related to LaRouche's 1984 presidential
campaign. Id. Prior to the indictment, NBC interviewed one of the individual
defendants for one hour and forty-five minutes, of which NBC later broadcast only
one minute. Id. Shortly thereafter, the other defendants served a subpoena du-
ces tecum on NBC seeking the video interview and the payment records concern-
ing the interviewee defendant. Id. After NBC sought protection under the First
Amendment, the trial court ordered NBC to produce the documents for in camera
review. Id. at 1178. It ordered the production because "the showing made by...
NBC... [was] a weak showing relative to ... the interests commonly implicated in
circumstances in which the assertion of the news gatherers' privilege is invoked."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting district court's decision). The court noted
that it was dealing with nonconfidential materials, and stated that the lack of confi-
dential sources makes the search for First Amendment interests a far more elusive
task. Id. at 1181.
48. Id. at 1181-82. NBC submitted an affidavit to the court outlining its First
Amendment interests. Id. The First Circuit deemed the interests legitimate, and
included them within its balancing test approach. Id. at 1182. The First Amend-
ment interests are:
"the threat of administrative and judicial intrusion" into the newsgather-
ing and editorial process; the disadvantage of ajournalist appearing to be
"an investigative arm of the judicial system" or a research tool of govern-
ment or of a private party; the disincentive to "compile and preserve non-
[Vol. III: p. 557
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terests outweighed the news agency's First Amendment interests.50
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit adopted the balancing approach favored by the Third Circuit
in Riley.5 1 In weighing the various interests, the D.C. Circuit looked
broadcast material"; [sic] and the burden on journalists' time and re-
sources in responding to subpoenas.
Id. (quoting affidavit from Thomas Ross, Senior Vice President of NBC News). To
amplify its concern over the possible infringement of the freedom of the press, the
court stated that "[w]e discern a lurking and subtle threat to journalists and their
employers if disclosure of outtakes, notes, and other unused information, even if
nonconfidential, becomes routine and casually, if not cavalierly, compelled." Id.
49. Id. In support of their request for production, the defendants relied
upon their Fifth Amendment rights to a fair trial and their Sixth Amendment
rights to compulsory process and effective confrontation and cross-examination of
adverse witnesses. Id. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State. . . ,and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fifth Amendment states that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, . . . nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Framers of the Bill of Rights did not prioritize the
Amendments numerically; therefore, the court is required to balance the First
Amendment against the Fifth and Sixth Amendments on a case-by-case basis. War-
ren, supra note 15, at 559.
50. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d at 1182. In affirming the production order,
the court emphasized certain factors that narrowed its holding, which included the
criminal nature of the litigation, that the requested materials concerned an impor-
tant, hostile witness and the fact that the comprehensive interview was likely to
produce a basis for impeachment. Id.
51. See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In Zerilli, the D.C.
Circuit first adopted the qualified journalist's privilege for use in the civil context.
Id. Two individuals accused of conspiracy to violate the Federal Travel Act brought
suit against the U.S. Attorney General, the Director of the FBI and the Department
ofJustice. Id. at 706. They claimed that the various government agencies allowed
sealed court documents concerning their illegal activities to be leaked to a Detroit
newspaper. Id. at 706-07. The Detroit News had published a series of articles enti-
tled Inside the Mafia. Id. at 707. The article contained characterizations of the two
accused individuals as a Detroit organized crime leader and an organized crime
cohort. Id. The reporter stated that the information contained in the article was
based on FBI logs. Id. The defendants did not seek discovery against certain indi-
viduals whom the government conceded had access to the wiretap logs. Id. at 708.
However, the defendants sought to depose the "Detroit News reporters regarding
the identity of the individuals who had released the wiretap logs." Id. at 709.
The Detroit News reporter "refused to answer, relying on a First Amendment
privilege not to disclose information tending to identify confidential sources." Id.
at 709 (footnote omitted). The district court denied the defendants' motion to
compel because "it was unable to find a compelling interest sufficient to warrant
subordination of First Amendment values" and the defendant failed to exhaust
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to more precise guidelines in balancing the interests on a case-by-
case basis, such as the efforts of the requesting party to "obtain the
information from alternative sources," whether the journalist is a
party to the litigation and whether the "information sought goes to
'the heart of the matter.' "52
2. The Formalized Three-Part Test
Other circuit courts have created or adopted a three-part or a
four-part test to determine whether the journalist must be required
to disclose his sources, information or materials.53 In 1980, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Miller
v. Transamerican Press, Inc.54 In this decision, the Fifth Circuit ap-
plied a three-part test based on the Second Circuit's holding in Gar-
land v. Torre.55 In deciding whether ajournalist had to disclose the
confidential source of his information, the court held that the fol-
alternative sources for the information. Id. (citing Zerilli v. Bell, 458 F. Supp. 26
(D.D.C. 1978)).
52. Id. at 713-14 (quoting Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 634 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974)). Additionally, the court implied that questioning
an additional 60 possible sources would not be an unreasonable requirement.
Zucker, supra note 15, at 8-55 (citing Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 715 n.53). See also Clyburn
v. News World Communications, Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recogniz-
ing qualified journalist's privilege under Zerilli); Grunseth v. Marriott Corp., 868 F.
Supp. 333, 334-37 (D.D.C. 1994) (same).
53. For an example of a formalized test, see Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. NFL, 89 F.R.D. 489 (C.D. Cal. 1981), in which the United States District
Court for the Central District of California applied a four-part test in determining
whether to quash a defendant's subpoena in a civil trial. Id. at 494, 496. The court
concluded that:
[iln civil cases, courts faced with motions to enforce or to quash subpoe-
nas directed against non-party journalists have refused to enforce such
subpoenas, absent a showing: (1) that the information is of certain rele-
vance; (2) that there is a compelling reason for disclosure; (3) that other
means of obtaining the information have been exhausted; and (4) that
the information sought goes to the heart of the seeker's case.
Id. at 494 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977);
Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d
Cir. 1958); Zerilli v. Bell, 458 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1978); Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd.
v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Altemose Constr.
Co. v. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976)).
54. 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980).
55. Id. at 726. In Miller, Overdrive Magazine published an article in 1972 enti-
tled Central State Pension Fund-How Your Sweat Finances Crooks' Cadillacs. Id. at 723.
The article alleged that the plaintiff, Miller, fraudulently embezzled $1.6 million
out of a pension fund. Id. Miller filed a libel suit against the journalists and
sought to discover the confidential source used in the article. Id. After ruling
three times against compelled disclosure due to the availability of other means of
proving recklessness, the district judge ordered disclosure, "concluding that the
informant's identity went to the heart of the matter." Id. For a further discussion
of Garland, see supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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lowing questions must be posed: "(1) is the information relevant,
(2) can the information be obtained by alternative means, and (3)
is there a compelling interest in the information."56 Subsequent to
Miller, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
adopted the Miller test to protect confidential sources used in the
production of a television program. 57 The Second Circuit applied a
heightened three-part test to determine that a publishing company
could refuse to reveal information dealing with confidential sources
in In re Petroleum Products.58 The court held that "disclosure may be
56. Miller, 621 F.2d at 726. The Fifth Circuit determined that the district
court was correct in holding that the information was relevant and that the plain-
tiff had exhausted reasonable alternative means for obtaining the information. Id.
The court held that the requesting party demonstrated that a compelling interest
existed under the third prong of its test because he needed to know the identity of
the confidential source to prove actual malice. Id. at 726-27.
Subsequent courts within the Fifth Circuit have followed the Miller decision.
See generally In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792-99 (5th Cir. 1983); Holland v. Centen-
nial Homes, Inc., Nos. 3:92-CV-1533-T, 3:92-CV-1534-T, 1993 WL 755590, at *3-*6
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 1993); Cinel v. Connick, 792 F. Supp. 492, 498-500 (E.D. La.
1992), aff'd, 15 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 189 (1994); Karem
v. Priest, 744 F. Supp. 136, 138-42 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
A relevancy requirement, such as the one set forth in Miller, serves as a height-
ened version of Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Zucker, supra note 15, at
8-51. See also AndrewJ. Norris, To Divulge or Not to Divulge: The Ability of an Agricul-
tural Researcher to Avoid CERCLA 's Affirmative Disclosure Requirements, 9J. LAND USE &
ENvTL. L. 327, 339 (1994) (stating that "heart of the claim" requirement is height-
ened relevancy standard) (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)). Rule 401 states: " 'Rele-
vant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
57. LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986). The Fourth Cir-
cuit adopted the Miller three-part test to balance the competing interests at issue in
LaRouche. Id. In LaRouche, NBC News published two separate television programs
concerning Lyndon H. LaRouche. Id. at 1136. One of the programs aired on the
NBC Nightly News and the other aired on First Camera. Id. LaRouche alleged that
the two programs contained defamatory statements about him. Id. He moved to
compel, from NBC, a list of the sources responsible for providing the information
dealing with his beliefs, his organization and his alleged proposal to assassinate
President Jimmy Carter. Id. at 1136-37. When applying the three-part test, the
court held that the attorneys for LaRouche did not exhaust reasonable alternative
means for obtaining the requested information. Id. at 1137. Subsequent cases
within the Fourth Circuit have embraced the LaRouche decision. See Church of
Scientology Int'l v. Daniels, 992 F.2d 1329, 1335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct
195 (1993); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 854-55 (4th Cir. 1992) (Wilkinson, J., con-
curring); Stickels v. General Rental Co., 750 F. Supp. 729, 731-33 (E.D. Va. 1990).
For a further discussion of the Miller test, see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying
text.
58. 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982). The Petroleum Prod-
ucts case began with a lawsuit filed by the states of Arizona, California, Florida,
Oregon and Washington against 17 oil companies for their alleged violation of
federal antitrust laws. Id. at 6. The states alleged that the oil companies conspired
to set prices for refined oil products and the conspiracy was possibly "facilitated by
communications to and from trade publications." Id. at 7. The states served a
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ordered only upon a clear and specific showing that the informa-
tion is: highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to the
maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable from other available
sources." 59 Subsequently, the Second Circuit applied the Petroleum
Products test during a criminal case in United States v. Burke.60 In
Burke, the court held that the third party journalists did not have
to disclose nonconfidential materials. 61 Recently, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the
Petroleum Products test to a request for nonconfidential information
during a civil trial.62 The court required disclosure because it
found the information highly material and relevant, necessary and
critical to the defense, and unavailable from another source.63
subpoena duces tecum on the publisher of Platt's Oilgram Price Report seeking the
"production of any document referring to communications concerning petroleum
products prices for the period 1970-73." Id. (citing the subpoena issued to Platt's
Oilgram Price Report). The publisher refused to produce the documents, which
contained information dealing with confidential sources, under the journalist's
privilege. Id. The trial judge ordered the publisher to produce the names and
documents because the need for disclosure outweighed the privilege against such
a disclosure. Id. Upon the publisher's continued refusal, the court fined the pub-
lisher $100 per day for civil contempt. Id.
59. Id. (citing Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783-85 (2d Cir. 1972)). The
court stated that its adherence to this test would "protect the important interests of
reporters and the public in preserving the confidentiality ofjournalists' sources."
Id. The court applied its three-part test and held that there was an insufficient
basis for requiring the publishing company to disclose its sources because the
states did not seek the information from any other means, nor did they prove that
the publisher was involved with the price-setting. Id. at 8. Additionally, the court
held that there was less interest in disclosure here than in Branzburg because this
case dealt with a civil matter and Branzburgdealt with a grand jury proceeding. Id.
at 9.
60. 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983).
61. Id. at 76-78. In Burke, a criminal defendant served a subpoena on the
magazine Sports Illustrated and on one of its journalists. Id. at 76. The defendant
sought "virtually every document and tape" dealing with an article co-written by
another defendant. Id. The trial court held that the defendant's need for the
information, to impeach testimony, did not defeat the journalist's First Amend-
ment privilege. Id. On appeal, although the Second Circuit held that the criminal
nature of the litigation may be an important factor, the court barred disclosure
because the defendant failed to "make the clear and specific showing that [the]
documents were necessary or critical to the maintenance of his defense." Id. at 77.
62. In re NBC, No. M8-85, 1995 WL 598972, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1995).
63. Id. at *1. Dateline, an NBC news program, aired a segment on infant
deaths caused by Graco Converta-Cradles. Id. The segment contained interviews
with the plaintiffs to a product liability suit against the cradle manufacturer, Graco
Children's Products (Graco). Id. Graco served a subpoena on NBC seeking the
interview outtakes and the interview notes. Id. NBC filed a motion to quash the
subpoena under the New York State Shield Law, the New York State Constitution
and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. During oral argu-
ment, Graco limited its request to the interview outtakes. Id. NBC admitted, dur-
ing oral argument, that the information was nonconfidential and that the
individuals being interviewed did not have an expectation of confidentiality. Id.
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III. SHOEN v. SHOEN
A. Factual Background
Ronald Watkins, an author of investigative books, 64 contracted
with a major publishing company to write Birthright: Murder, Greed
and Power in the U-Haul Family Dynasty.65 This book chronicled the
bitter Shoen family feud.66 In a portion of the book, Watkins also
detailed the 1990 brutal death of Eva Berg Shoen, who was mur-
The district court applied the three-part Petroleum Products test and held that NBC
must observe the subpoenas and produce any video out-takes of interviews of the
plaintiffs. Id. at *1-*2. The court stated that the requested outtakes were highly
material and relevant because it contained the plaintiffs' inconsistent statements; it
was necessary and critical because it provided a defense for Graco and it was un-
available from other sources because it was solely in NBC's control. Id. at *1.
See also United States v. Hendron, 820 F. Supp. 715, 716-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(applying three-part Burke test to disclosure request for third party reporter's non-
confidential materials during criminal trial); Don King Prod. v. Douglas, 131
F.R.D. 421, 422-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying three-part Burke test to disclosure re-
quest for third party reporter's nonconfidential materials during civil trial); West-
moreland v. CBS, 97 F.R.D. 703, 704-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying three-part
Petroleum Products test to disclosure request for defendant's nonconfidential "self-
evaluative analysis" during civil trial). For examples of courts which followed both
the Burke decision and the Petroleum Products decision, see United States v. Curler, 6
F.3d 67, 70-72 (2d Cir. 1993); Aequitron Medical, Inc. v. CBS, No. 93 Civ. 950
(DC), 1995 WL 406157, at *2-*3, (S.D.N.Y.July 10, 1995); In re Behar, 779 F. Supp.
273, 274-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Marcos, No. SSSS 87 CR. 598 (FK),
1990 WL 74521, at *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1990).
64. Shoen v. Shoen (Shoen I), 48 F.3d 412, 413 (9th Cir. 1995). Prior to his
book on the Shoen family, Ronald Watkins wrote two non-fiction investigative
books. Shoen v. Shoen (Shoen 1), 5. F.3d 1289, 1290 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993). His first
book, High Crimes and Misdemeanors, was about the impeachment of Evan Mecham,
the former governor of Arizona, and his second book, Evil Intentions, detailed the
murder of Suzanne Rossetti. Id.
65. RONALD J. WATKINS, BIRTHRIGHT: MURDER, GREED AND POWER IN THE U-
HAUL FAMILY DYNASrY (1993) [hereinafter BIRTHRIGHT]. William Morrow & Com-
pany published BIRTHRIGHT in December 1993. Elliot B. Smith & Jeff Rowe, Busi-
ness Bookshelf, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 14, 1993, at C-6.
66. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 413; Shoen 1, 5 F.3d at 1290. The Shoen family owns
and controls the U-Haul rental truck company. Shoen , 5 F.3d at 1290. The Shoen
family feud originated in 1987 when Joe Shoen, son of U-Haul founder Leonard
Shoen, removed his father from the U-Haul Board of Directors. Catherine
Reagor, U-Haul Fights $1.47 Billion Verdict in Family Feud, Bus.J. (Phoenix), Oct. 14,
1994, § 1, at 3. At that point, Leonard Shoen and several of the twelve Shoen
children, owners of 47% of the U-Haul stock, sought to either sell the company or
take it public. Id. To prevent the takeover, Joe Shoen issued 8,099 shares of stock,
an act which gave the board of directors majority control and blocking any coup
attempt by the L.S. Shoen group. Id. On October 7, 1994, ajury decided thatJoe
Shoen and other members of the board of directors acted improperly to defeat the
coalition's plans. Author of Book on U-Haul Family Feud Spared Jailing, RocKY MOuN-
TAIN NEWS (Denver), Feb. 17, 1995, at A22 [hereinafter Author of Book on U-Haul
Family Feud]; Reagor, supra, at 3. The trial judge later reduced the jury's $1.48
billion damage award to $461.8 million. Id. See generally Shoen v. Amerco, 885 F.
Supp. 1332 (D. Nev. 1994) (describing Shoen family feud and lawsuit between
Shoen family members over control of U-Haul); Amerco v. Shoen, 907 P.2d 536,
1996]
17
Baum: The Journalist's Privilege: Ensuring that Compelled Disclosure Is
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
574 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
dered at the family's cabin in Telluride, Colorado. 67 In exchange
for a series of interviews, Watkins agreed to share royalties and pro-
ceeds with the U-Haul founder, Leonard Shoen.68 Leonard Shoen
and Watkins did not keep their agreement secret and there was no
expectation of confidentiality for the interviews. 69 Beginning in
September 1991, Watkins interviewed Leonard Shoen numerous
times concerning the Shoen family, the battle for control of U-Haul
and the unsolved Shoen murder.70
Prior to his interviews with Ronald Watkins, "Leonard Shoen
made at least 29 public statements, most to the press, implicating
his sons, Mark and Edward in the death of Eva Berg Shoen. ' 71 Be-
cause of the severity of these statements, Mark and Edward Shoen
filed a defamation action against their father, alleging damage to
their reputations occasioned by his public statements. 72
B. Procedural Background
During pretrial discovery, Mark and Edward Shoen served Wat-
kins with a subpoena duces tecum, to gain insight into their father's
public statements. 73 At his deposition, Watkins declined to pro-
537 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (describing "many battles in the ongoing Shoen family
war for control of the U-Haul corporate empire").
67. Shoen I, 48 F.3d at 413. Eva Berg Shoen was the wife of Sam Shoen, Leo-
nard Shoen's oldest son. Swen 1, 5 F.3d at 1290. When the Ninth Circuit decided
Shoen I, the 1990 murder remained unsolved. Id. In July 1993, authorities arrested
Frank Marquis in connection with the murder. Brent Whiting, Killer of U-Haul
Heiress Sentenced in Plea Bargain, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 24, 1994, at BI. On Novem-
ber 24, 1994, a Colorado court sentenced Marquis to 24 years in jail under a plea
bargain agreement. Id. As part of the plea bargain, Marquis had to assist the po-
lice in locating evidence and answer other questions concerning Eva Berg Shoen's
death. Id.
68. Shoen A1, 48 F.3d at 413.
69. Shoen , 5 F.3d at 1290.
70. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 413; Slwen , 5 F.3d at 1290. Watkins tape recorded
several of the interviews. Shoen , 5 F.3d at 1290.
71. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 413. Leonard Shoen made the allegedly defamatory
statements between September 1990 and August 1991. Id. at 417.
72. Id. at 413. The two sons claimed that the allegedly defamatory statements
caused irreparable damage to their reputation. Ellen Miller, U-Haul Heir Speaks
Out About Murder, DENVER PosT, Nov. 2, 1994, at Al. They also claimed that Leo-
nard Shoen and their older brother Sam Shoen hired a public relations firm to
link them to the murder. Id.
73. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 414. Mark and Edward Shoen did not allege that their
father made any defamatory statements to Watkins. Id. However, they wanted
Watkins to appear for a deposition and bring any document or recording dealing
with the Shoen family feud and the death of Eva Berg Shoen. Id. Watkins sought
protection under the Arizona press shield law. Shoen I, 5 F.3d at 1291. The district
court rejected this attempt because the Arizona Court of Appeals interpreted this
statute to exclude investigative book authors from its protection. Id. at 1291 n.3
(citing Matera v. Superior Court, 825 P.2d 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)).
[Vol. III: p. 557
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duce documents or recordings or to answer questions dealing with
his interviews of Leonard Shoen.7 4  The United States District
Court for the District of Arizona held Watkins in contempt when he
refused to appear at his second scheduled deposition. 75 The Ninth
Circuit reversed the contempt order and remanded the case to the
district court.76 In Shoen I, the Ninth Circuit decided three main
issues: first, that an investigative book author can have standing to
invoke the journalist's privilege; second, that the journalist's privi-
lege can protect nonconfidential resource materials; and third, that
the plaintiffs, the Shoen brothers, failed to meet the threshold re-
quirements for disclosure. 77
Three days after the Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to
the district court, the plaintiffs again sought to compel disclosure
from Watkins because they had recently deposed Leonard Shoen.78
74. Shoen , 5 F.3d at 1291. Mark and Edward Shoen filed a motion to compel
the production of the documents and testimony when Watkins failed to comply
with the subpoena duces tecum. Id. In response, Watkins asserted that disclosure
of the information dealing with Leonard Shoen's interviews would infringe upon
his journalist's qualified privilege under the First Amendment. Id. The district
court granted the motion to compel. Id. The court rejected Watkins' argument
and held that "the qualified privilege must yield to the plaintiffs' litigation needs."
Id.
75. Id. In ordering Watkins to testify, the court held that Mark and Edward
Shoen "were entitled to 'each and every method, mode, scrap of paper, computer
disk, note, recollection, shred of evidence that would evidence' Leonard Shoen's
communications to Watkins on matters concerning 'the murder, the family feud,
and any statements made as to ... the plaintiffs [Mark and Edward Shoen] them-
selves.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting telephone conference between court
and parties).
76. Id. at 1298.
77. Id. at 1293-98. First, the court adopted the Second Circuit's test to deter-
mine that Watkins did have standing to invoke the privilege because he was an
investigative book author. Id. at 1293 (citing von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987)). The Second Circuit's test looks to
"whether the person seeking to invoke the privilege had 'the intent to use mate-
rial-sought, gathered or received-to disseminate information to the public and
[whether] such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering process.' " Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144). Second, the court
held that the journalist's privilege could protect a journalist's nonconfidential ma-
terial. Id. at 1295. Third, the Ninth Circuit held that Mark and Edward Shoen
failed to meet the threshold requirements for compelling disclosure because they
did not exhaust "all reasonable alternative means for obtaining the information."
Id. at 1296 (citing Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Therefore,
they did not "demonstrate a sufficiently compelling need for the journalist's mater-
ials to overcome the privilege." Id. For a discussion of Second Circuit case law
regarding the journalist's privilege, see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
78. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 414. The plaintiffs deposed Leonard Shoen during the
period between the oral argument and the Ninth Circuit's decision. Id. According
to the plaintiffs, by deposing Leonard Shoen they had exhausted all reasonable
alternative sources for the material and were entitled to the tapes and notes of the
interviews between Watkins and Leonard Shoen. Id.
1996] 575
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The district court ruled that the plaintiffs exhausted all reasonable
sources for the information and granted the motion to compel Wat-
kins' disclosure of the requested information.7 9 Watkins again re-
fused to attend his deposition or produce the requested materials.80
The district court declared Watkins a recalcitrant witness and or-
dered his incarceration under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a). 81 Ronald Wat-
kins then appealed the district court's ruling to the Ninth Circuit.8 2
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
In Shoen II, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's order
compelling Watkins to produce his nonconfidential materials gath-
ered during the interviewing process83 The primary issue before
the Ninth Circuit thus became "whether [the] plaintiffs had
demonstrated a 'sufficiently compelling need' for the requested
materials to overcome Watkins' assertion of the journalist's
79. Id. The district court ordered Watkins to attend the deposition and to
produce for examination materials dealing with the Shoen family feud and Eva
Berg Shoen's murder. Id.
80. Id. On August 19, 1994, the court held an oral argument to determine
whether Watkins should be held in contempt for his failure to comply with the
court's order. Id. After the oral argument, the court held that Watkins would be
incarcerated unless he immediately complied with the courts' previous order. Id.
81. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) states:
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or
grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to com-
ply with an order of the court to testify or provide other information,
including any book, paper, document, record, recording or other mate-
rial, the court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to
its attention, may summarily order his confinement at a suitable place
until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide
such information. No period of such confinement shall exceed the life
of-
(1) the court proceeding, or
(2) the term of the grand jury, including extensions,
before which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred, but in
no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen months.
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1994).
82. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 414. The Ninth Circuit "stayed the incarceration order
pending disposition" of Watkins' appeal. Id.
83. Id. at 414. As a preliminary matter, the court noted that all but one of the
circuits that have addressed Branzburg, interpreted it as establishing a journalist's
qualified privilege against disclosure of information gathered in the course of their
work. Id. (citing Shoen , 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993)). The court af-
firmed its Shoen I decision concerning two of the three issues present on appeal.
Id. First, the court affirmed the holding that the journalist's privilege extends to
investigative book authors and, second, that the journalist's privilege can protect
nonconfidential sources and materials. Id.
20
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privilege. 8 4
Watkins argued that the Ninth Circuit had adopted a four-part
test in Shoen I to determine whether the journalist's privilege must
yield.85 In its holding, the district court had applied a three-part
test based upon its interpretation of Shoen 1.86 However, the Ninth
Circuit rejected both Watkins' and the district court's tests, finding
instead that "the Shoen I court did not adopt a test for determining
whether the requesting party has a compelling need sufficient to
override the privilege." 87
The court stated, in reaffirming its acceptance of a qualified
journalist's privilege, that the Shoen I court only observed the use
of a balancing test and thus did not enumerate a clear standard to
determine whether the journalist's privilege is overcome by the
need for the requested information. 88 The Ninth Circuit decided
that the time had come to formalize the required specific showing
in its balancing of competing interests.8 9
In evaluating the various First Amendment interests involved,
84. Id. at 414-415 (citing Shoen I, 5 F.3d at 1296).
85. Id. at 415. In addition to the three-part test used by the district court,
Watkins contended that a fourth element should look to whether the requesting
party had demonstrated that "the requested information goes to the 'heart of the
seeker's case.' " Id. Watkins argued that the Ninth Circuit, in Shoen I, adopted the
four-part test set forth by the United States District Court of the Central District of
California in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 89 F.R.D. 489 (C.D.
Cal. 1981). Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 415. For a discussion of Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum Comm'n, see supra note 53.
86. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 415-16. After the Shwen Icourt remanded the case, the
district court adopted a three-part test which examined the following: "(1) whether
the requesting party has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources; (2) whether
the information sought is relevant, material, and noncumulative; and (3) whether
the information sought is crucial to the maintenance of the plaintiffs' legal
claims." Id. at 415.
87. Id. The Ninth Circuit found Watkins' argument "unpersuasive." Id. Wat-
kins based his argument upon the Shoen I court's reference, in a footnote, to Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n. Id. The Ninth Circuit remarked that "[s]urely,
had the court chosen to announce such a test, it would not have done so in a
footnote." Id.
88. Id. The Siwen I court followed the earlier Ninth Circuit Farr decision
which held, "the process of deciding whether the privilege is overcome requires
that 'the claimed First Amendment privilege and the opposing need for disclosure
be judicially weighed in light of the surrounding facts, and a balance struck to
determine where lies the paramount interest.' " Shoen I, 5 F.3d at 1292-93 (quot-
ing Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976)) quoted in Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 415. The prior use of a mere balancing test
led the Shoen 1I court to proclaim that "[w] e have yet to formalize this balance by
identifying the specific showing required to pierce the journalist's privilege." Shoen
II, 48 F.3d at 415 (citing LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
89. Siwen /, 48 F.3d at 415. The court stated that there were two reasons for
creating a specific test: to alleviate the courts' and the parties' uncertainty over the
21
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the court held that "[t] he test we adopt must... ensure that com-
pelled disclosure is the exception, not the rule."90 To amplify the
importance of the journalist's privilege, the court proclaimed that
the significance of the privilege will be substantially diminished if it
"does not prevail in all but the most exceptional cases." 91
The Ninth Circuit further noted that no other circuit had
adopted a specific test to determine when a journalist must pro-
duce nonconfidential information. 92 The court recognized that a
few circuits did establish tests to determine when the privilege
should yield to a civil litigant's need for the identity of confidential
sources.
93
With the facts of Shoen II and the background of the journal-
ist's privilege expressed, the Ninth Circuit established its test as
follows:
[W]here information sought is not confidential, a
civil litigant is entitled to requested discovery notwith-
standing a valid assertion of the journalist's privilege by a
nonparty only upon a showing that the requested material
is: (1) unavailable despite exhaustion of all reasonable al-
privilege's application and to finally resolve whether Watkins must provide the re-
quested materials to the Shoen brothers. Id.
90. Id. at 416. The Ninth Circuit, when deciding what test to accept, "recog-
nize [d] that routine court-compelled disclosure of research materials poses a seri-
ous threat to the vitality of the newsgathering process." Id. at 415-16. The court
noted " 'a lurking and subtle threat to journalists and their employers if disclosure
of outtakes, notes, and other unused information, even if nonconfidential, be-
comes routine and casually, if not cavalierly, compelled.'" Id. at 416 (citing
United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988)). In
addition, the court cited the First Circuit's LaRouche Campaign decision as setting
forth a list of First Amendment media interests against compelled disclosure. Id.
For a discussion of the First Circuit's proposed First Amendment media interests,
see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
91. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 416 (quoting Zeri//i, 656 F.2d at 712).
92. Id. The court stated that under the facts presented in Shoen I Leonard
Shoen was not considered a confidential source nor did he request that his inter-
views with Watkins not be disclosed to third parties. Id.
93. Id. In particular, the Ninth Circuit highlighted the test used by the Sec-
ond Circuit in In re Petroleum Products. Id. The Second Circuit held that "disclosure
may be ordered only upon a clear and specific showing that the information is:
highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim,
and not obtainable from other available sources." Id. (quoting In re Petroleum
Products, 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982)). The Ninth
Circuit also cited the Fourth, Fifth and D.C. Circuits as jurisdictions that have
adopted and applied similar tests. Id. (citing LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134,
1139 (4th Cir. 1986); Zerill, 656 F.2d at 713-15; Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621
F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981)). For a further
discussion of the various tests applied in other circuits, see supra notes 31-63 and
accompanying text.
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ternative sources; (2) noncumulative; and (3) clearly rele-
vant to an important issue in the case. We note that there
must be a showing of actual relevance; a showing of poten-
tial relevance will not suffice. 94
In applying its newly adopted test, the Ninth Circuit considered the
plaintiffs' position, whereby their need for the information out-
weighed Watkins' First Amendment interests.95 The plaintiffs fur-
ther argued that the information could demonstrate that Leonard
Shoen made the allegedly defamatory statements with actual malice
and such information could be used t6 impeach his testimony.96
The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected this argument and held
that the plaintiffs' request for the privileged information failed the
second and third prongs of the newly adopted test.97 Thus, the
94. Shoen I 48 F.3d at 416. Prior to adopting its test, the court noted that the
Shwen I court had "observed that 'the lack of a confidential source may be an im-
portant element in balancing the .. .need for the material sought against the
interest of the journalist in preventing production in a particular case.' " Id. (quot-
ing United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1126 (1981)) (alteration in original). This "confidential source" element,
cited from Cuthbertson, apparently influenced the Ninth Circuit in its decision to
adopt the Shoen II test. Id. (stating newly adopted three-part test directly after
above cited Cuthbertson quotation).
95. Id. at 416-18.
96. Id. at 416-17. The plaintiffs felt the information could impeach Leonard
Shoen's testimony because Leonard Shoen testified during his deposition that he
"loved his sons and harbored no ill will toward them." Id. at 417.
97. Id. at 417. Under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the
plaintiffs were considered to be public figures and, therefore, had to prove that
Leonard Shoen made the statements knowing they were "(1) false, and (2) ...
with knowledge of their falsehood or with reckless disregard of the truth." Shoen I,
48 F.3d at 417 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80). Under Arizona defamation
law, public figures may rely on circumstantial evidence of ill will in their efforts to
prove the New York Times v. Sullivan definition of actual malice. Currier v. Western
Newspapers, Inc., 855 P.2d 1351, 1355 (Ariz. 1993) (citing Dombey v. Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc., 724 P.2d 562, 574 (Ariz. 1986)). In Shoen II, the plaintiffs argued
that the contents of the Watkins' interview could prove their father's ill will. Shoen
II, 48 F.3d at 417.
First, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff must prove actual malice at the
time the allegedly defamatory statements were made. Id. (citing New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280). Therefore, Leonard Shoen's interviews with Watkins
could not be considered "clearly relevant to an important issue in this litigation." Id.
(emphasis added). Secondly, the Ninth Circuit held that "the requested material
is also cumulative insofar as it pertains to the question of ill will." Id. During the
Shoen litigation, Leonard Shoen had already made statements demonstrating ill
will, such as his referring to a son as Hitler and saying that he thought Mark and
Edward Shoen were sociopaths. Id. To further support its decision, the court
stated that Watkins signed three affidavits providing that he did not discuss the
allegedly defamatory statements with Leonard Shoen. Id. at 417-18. The Ninth
Circuit also held that use of the information to impeach Leonard Shoen's testi-
mony did not relate to "an important issue in the case." Id. at 418. The court felt
the effort to prove actual malice should not force the disclosure. Id. at 418.
19961
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Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's contempt ruling.98
B. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Leavy stated that the plaintiffs met their
burden by fulfilling the three-part test adopted in the majority's
opinion. 99 First, the dissent determined that the requested infor-
mation was relevant evidence under the third prong of the test.100
Second, the dissent maintained that the requested evidence was not
cumulative.10' In sum, Judge Leavy would have held that the dis-
trict court's contempt order should have been affirmed. 10 2
98. Shoen , 48 F.3d at 417-18. At the conclusion of the defamation action,
the jury in the district court refused to award damages to Joe and Mark Shoen.
Brent Whiting, Jury Refuses to Give Damages to U-Haul Brothers in Libel Suit, ARiz.
REPUBLiC, Apr. 9, 1995, at B6. An attorney for the Shoen brothers stated that "the
jury 'obviously' was confused by the case as evidenced by its seemingly inconsistent
verdicts." John Schwartz, U-Haul's Joe, Mark Shoen Appeal Libel Verdict, Bus. J. (Phoe-
nix), July 21, 1995, § 1, at 3.
99. Shoen I, 48 F.3d at 418-19 (Leavy, J., dissenting). The dissent did not
directly address whether the information was available from a reasonable alterna-
tive source, first prong of the majority's test. Id. at 418 (Leavy, J., dissenting).
Judge Leavy simply stated that due to the requirements to prove actual malice, "the
requested material is practically unavailable, despite the plaintiffs' exhaustion of
all reasonable alternative sources." Id. at 419 (Leavy, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 418-19 (Leavy,J., dissenting). Judge Leavy remarked that there was
"no more relevant evidence available to any party that would help the trier of fact
to determine whether, at the time Shoen published the ... statements, he may
have known they were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at
419 (Leavy, J., dissenting). He stated that Leonard Shoen's alleged defamatory
public statements could not be deemed irrelevant by the "mere passage of time."
Id. at 418 (Leavy, J., dissenting). Judge Leavy felt that to hold as the majority did
"would effectively preclude the admission of any evidence that does not coincide
precisely with the time of the allegedly defamatory act(s)." Id. (Leavy, J., dissent-
ing) (alterations in original). Additionally, the dissent stated that the interviews
could reveal Leonard Shoen's knowledge of his daughter-in-law's death. Id. at 419
(Leavy, J., dissenting). This knowledge had a direct relationship to the plaintiffs'
actual malice claim. Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting). Judge Leavy stated that, although other evi-
dence existed showing ill will, "it [was] not enough under Sullivan to prove mere
ill will on Shoen's part; rather, the plaintiffs must prove the extent of his knowl-
edge." Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting). He also stated that any evidence demonstrating
Leonard Shoen's actual knowledge of Eva Berg Shoen's murder is noncumulative.
Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting). Additionally, Judge Leavy felt the following two factors
strengthened the necessity for disclosure, "[flirst, the trial court offered to allow
Watkins to redact any material that might suggest the existence and identity of a
confidential source; and, second, Shoen is to have a share in future royalties on
the book and any possible movie deal." Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting). He asserted that
this sharing of the proceeds destroyed Watkins' professional ethical obligation to
Leonard Shoen. Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting). Judge Leavy, therefore, determined
that the Shoen brothers sought the evidence to prove Leonard Shoen's actual mal-
ice when making the statements, not to prove he lied about his feelings towards his
sons while being deposed. Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 419 (Leavy, J., dissenting). Judge Leavy also stated, after scrutiniz-
ing the application of the three-part test, that the plaintiffs met the burden im-
[Vol. III: p. 557
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A. Creation of the Three-Part Test
In Shoen II, the Ninth Circuit held that it had not previously
adopted a formal test to determine "whether the requesting party
has a compelling need sufficient to override the [journalist's] privi-
lege." 10 3 The Ninth Circuit's conclusion is correct because the
Shoen I court stopped its analysis when it had decided that the plain-
tiffs failed to obtain discovery from other reasonable alternative
means.1 0 4 As the court correctly stated in Shoen II, the Shoen Icourt
did not look to other balancing factors besides the "all reasonable
alternative means" factor, nor did it apply or adopt a formal three
or four-part test.105
As a backdrop to its discussion on the showing required to
overcome the journalist's privilege, the Ninth Circuit recognized
four specific First Amendment media interests against discovery re-
quests.106 The Ninth Circuit almost definitively accepted these four
posed upon them by the majority's test. Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting). Therefore,
Judge Leavy felt that the plaintiffs, Mark and Edward Shoen, were entitled to dis-
closure of the requested information because they overcame Watkins' assertion of
the journalist's privilege. Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting).
103. Swen ., 48 F.3d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1995). For a further discussion of the
Ninth Circuit's prior failure to accept such a test, see supra notes 85-87 and accom-
panying text.
104. Shoen I, 5 F.3d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Zerilli v. Smith, 656
F.2d 705, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The Swen Icourt did not address the other fac-
tors of the balancing test because it held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy this
threshold requirement. Id. at 1296 n.14.
105. Id. In footnote 14 of its decision, the Shoen Icourt stated that "[b] ecause
we hold that plaintiffs have not satisfied the exhaustion requirement, we express
no opinion on whether plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing on the other
questions considered in the balance." Id. Absent any Ninth Circuit precedent on
this issue, the Shoen II court correctly rejected the three-part test applied by the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona and the four-part test pro-
posed by Watkins. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 415. For a further discussion of the test used
by the district court and the test proffered by Watkins, see supra notes 85-87 and
accompanying text.
106. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 415-416 (citing Shoen , 5 F.3d at 1294-95). The
Ninth Circuit adopted the First Amendment interests set forth by the First Circuit
in United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988).
Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 416. The First Circuit set forth the following First Amendment
interests in favor of the journalist's privilege:
"the threat of administrative and judicial intrusion" into the newsgather-
ing and editorial process; the disadvantage of a journalist appearing to be
"an investigative arm of the judicial system" or a research tool of govern-
ment or of a private party; the disincentive to "compile and preserve non-
broadcast material"; [sic] and the burden on journalists' time and re-
sources in responding to subpoenas.
LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d at 1182. See also Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 416 (listing
LaRouche Campaign First Amendment interests); Shoen I, 5 F.3d at 1294-95 (same).
For a further discussion of the First Amendment media interests highlighted by
19961
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interests. 10 7 Yet, the First Circuit, the circuit that originally identi-
fied the interests, 10 8 stated only that "[t] here is some merit to these
asserted First Amendment interests." 10 9 Although the Ninth Circuit
identified the media interests, it did not specifically explain how
the disclosure of the requested material would threaten Watkins'
interests or how disclosure would adversely effect his newsgathering
process. 110 Additionally, one could argue that a major television
network's media interests and an investigative book author's media
interests are not as similar as suggested by the Ninth Circuit.'1 '
In citing to a case from the D.C. Circuit, the Shoen II court
stated that " 'in the ordinary case the civil litigant's interest in dis-
closure should yield to the journalist's privilege.' "112 However, the
D.C. Circuit made this statement in reference to the disclosure of
confidential sources, not nonconfidential information, as was the
situation in Shoen J1.113 The Shoen II court recognized that the First
the Ninth Circuit and in LaRouche Campaign, see supra notes 48 & 90 and accompa-
nying text.
107. Shwen II, 48 F.3d at 416. The Ninth Circuit demonstrated its near defini-
tive acceptance by reaffirming the Shoen I court's recognition of the four media
interests set forth in LaRouche Campaign. Id.
108. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Although the First Circuit
originally recognized the four media interests, NBC, a major television network,
actually set forth the proposed interests. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d at 1181-82.
109. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d at 1182 (emphasis added). The First
Circuit continued its analysis by recognizing that a "lurking and subtle threat to
journalists" existed. Id. While the First Circuit used the media interests in its bal-
ancing test, the court did not discuss how it applied the interests to the facts of the
case. For a further discussion on LaRouche Campaign, see supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text.
110. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 415-16.
111. In LaRouche Campaign, the First Circuit was likely concerned about the
effect of granting the discovery request because it was dealing with a major televi-
sion network's newsgathering process, a process that disseminated news to the
public on a daily basis. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d at 1177, 1182. However, one
could view the burden upon an investigative book author as less imposing because
there is no necessity for the immediate and/or daily dissemination of information
and news. But see Shoen , 5 F.3d 1289, 1301 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kleinfeld,J., concur-
ring). In his concurring opinion,Judge Kleinfeld noted that compelled disclosure
placed significant burdens on Watkins. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). Judge
Kleinfeld stated that such burdens included Watkins losing potential sources, the
damaging effect on Watkins' "legitimate commercial interest in shaping the mode,
form, and timing of disclosure" of the Leonard Shoen interviews and intimidation
causing Watkins to not tell what he believes to be the truth about Mark and Ed-
ward Shoen. Id. (Kleinfeld,J., concurring).
112. Slwen II, 48 F.3d at 416 (quoting Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)). For a further discussion of Zerilli v. Smith, see supra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text.
113. The Ninth Circuit determined that Leonard Shoen was a nonconfiden-
tial source and that Leonard Shoen did not request that his interviews with Wat-
kins not be disclosed to third parties. Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 416. For a discussion of
the information sought in Zerilli, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
[Vol. III: p. 557
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Amendment privilege affords journalists seeking to protect confi-
dential sources more protection than it affords journalists seeking
to protect nonconfidential sources or material.1 14 Yet, it appears
that the Ninth Circuit treated confidential sources and nonconfi-
dential information equally when citing Zerilli v. Smith.
Prior to adopting its own three-part test, the Ninth Circuit
stated that no other circuit had adopted a formalized test applying
to ajournalist's nonconfidential information. 11 5 However, the Sec-
ond Circuit applied a three-part test in United States v. Burke.116 In
Burke, the requested information consisted of documents and other
material used in writing a Sports Illustrated article.1 17 The Second
Circuit discussed the joumalist's privilege as it related to confiden-
tial sources, yet Burke contained no confidential sources. i8 The
court applied the Petroleum Products three-part test for confidential
sources1 9 to the Burke situation.' 2 0 Subsequent cases within the
Second Circuit have similarly applied the three-part test used in
Burke and Petroleum Products to cases dealing with nonconfidential
materials and information. 21
114. Shoen I1, 48 F.3d at 416 (observing "lack of a confidential source may be
an important element in balancing the [competing interests]") (quoting Shoen I,
5 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted)). One could support this
extra protection by applying the four First Amendment interests, whereby a poten-
tial confidential source might view the journalist as an investigative arm of the
judicial system or a research tool of the government, and therefore refuse to dis-
cuss the potentially newsworthy information.
115. Shoen , 48 F.3d at 416.
116. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's application of a three-part test,
see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
117. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816
(1983). The Second Circuit referred to the requested information as "documents"
and "work papers." Id. at 77-78.
118. Id. at 76-78. In Burke, the source of information for the article was one of
the co-authors. Id. at 76.
119. For a discussion of the Petroleum Products three-part test, see supra notes
58-59 and accompanying text.
120. Burke, 700 F.2d at 77-78.
121. For example, in In re NBC, No. M8-85, 1995 WL 598972 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
10, 1995), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
applied the Petroleum Products test during a civil suit. Id. at *1. The court decided
that NBC had to produce nonconfidential material that had "no expectation of
privacy." Id. The court was highly critical of NBC's motion to quash the subpoe-
nas. Id. at *2. The court stated:
NBC has no interest in the out-takes and any statements contained
therein were never considered confidential by those being interviewed.
This seems, at best, an academic pursuit by counsel to [NBC] which
caused needless expense to NBC and to the parties. This type of useless
proceeding merely clogs the dockets of our courts.
Id.
Furthermore, in United States v. Hendron, 820 F. Supp. 715, 718 (E.D.N.Y.
1993), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held
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As the court asserted, the Ninth Circuit needed to adopt a for-
mal balancing test to identify the specific showing required to over-
come the journalist's privilege. 122 The need for a formal test is best
illustrated by two facts. First, the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona declared Watkins in civil contempt twice,
and also Watkins appeared twice before the Ninth Circuit in a two
year period.123 Second, the district court did not know how to
determine the sufficient showing required to overcome the journal-
ist's privilege. 124 This confusion and prolonged litigation demon-
strated the need to adopt a formal test.125 The Ninth Circuit
effectively addressed these two concerns by adopting the formal
three-part Shoen II test.
B. Application of the Three-Part Test
Judge Leavy's dissent accepted the majority's adoption of a
three-part test for determining whether sufficient showing has been
made to overcome the journalist's privilege.' 26 Judge Leavy, how-
ever, did not accept the majority's application of the three-part test
in determining that Watkins need not produce his information for
review. 127
that the Burke decision applied beyond cases dealing solely with confidential infor-
mation. Id. at 718. The court stated that the Burke court "did not discuss the fact
that [the source in Burke] was in no sense a 'confidential source' .... The decision
thus recognized that the reporter had First Amendment interests beyond those of preserving the
confidentiality of his source or of his information." Id. (emphasis added). See also Don
King Prod. v. Douglas, 131 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Burke as apply-
ing three-part test for nonconfidential materials); Westmoreland v. CBS, 97 F.R.D.
703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Burke as applying three-part test to determine
whether reporter's nonconfidential documents need to be disclosed).
122. Shoen , 48 F.3d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1995).
123. Id. at 414. Following the media interests approach set forth by the court,
one could argue that the prolonged Shoen litigation placed a burden on Watkins'
time and resources, taking him away from the investigatory process.
124. Id. at 415. The district court, interpreting Shoen I, applied a three-part
test to determine that Watkins had to disclose the requested material. Id. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit declared that it had never adopted a formal test in Shoen
L Id. For a further discussion of the district courts' misinterpretation of Shoen I,
see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
125. Shoen 1, 48 F.3d at 415.
126. Id. at 418-19 (Leavy, J., dissenting). Judge Leavy considered two addi-
tional factors beyond those enumerated in the majority's three-part test: the dis-
trict court's offer to redact any information dealing with a confidential source and
Leonard Shoen's share in future royalties. Id. at 419. This essentially created a
hybrid analysis, consisting of the majority's three-part test and the Ninth Circuit's
former case-by-case balancing approach. For a further discussion ofJudge Leavy's
dissent, see supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
127. Shoen , 48 F.3d at 419. To the contrary, Judge Leavy stated that "the
plaintiffs have more than carried their burden with respect to all three prongs of
the test enunciated here." Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting).
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Under the Arizona defamation law, the plaintiffs had to prove
that Leonard Shoen made the allegedly defamatory statements with
actual malice.12 8 Although the majority opinion concluded that evi-
dence of ill will alone cannot prove actual malice, it failed to ad-
dress what impact Leonard Shoen's knowledge of the murder
would have on the defamation case. 129 Thus, the majority held that
the evidence of ill will was not clearly relevant to an important is-
sue1 30 However, the plaintiffs could have used the requested
materials to show the extent of Leonard Shoen's knowledge, and,
in this manner, the material could be considered relevant.13' The
court likely dismissed this possibility because the requested evi-
dence was only potentially relevant, not actually relevant as re-
quired by the third prong of the Shoen II test.132 This requirement
poses an unanswered question: how can a party prove actual rele-
vance absent an opportunity to determine if the requested informa-
tion is indeed actually relevant to their case?
VI. CONCLUSION
In Shoen II, the Ninth Circuit formally adopted a three-part test
to alleviate the uncertainty expressed by district courts and liti-
gants.13 3 A court can apply the Shoen H test to determine when the
third party journalist's qualified First Amendment privilege yields
to a civil litigants's discovery request for nonconfidential informa-
tion. l 4 The Ninth Circuit's three-part Shoen II test, however, is a-
128. Id. at 417.
129. Id. The majority remarked that Watkins signed an affidavit stating that
he did not interview Leonard Shoen about the allegedly defamatory statements.
Id. at 417-18. Even if this was true, Leonard Shoen could have discussed his knowl-
edge of Eva Berg Shoen's murder. Id. at 419 (Leavy, J., dissenting). If the inter-
views proved that Leonard Shoen knew nothing about the murder, the plaintiffs
could have shown he made the statements with knowledge of their falsehood or
with actual malice. Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting). Thus, the court could consider the
evidence to be "clearly relevant to an important issue in the litigation." Id. at 418-
19 (Leavy, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 417. Judge Leavy's dissent asserted numerous times that the re-
quested information was relevant to "determine whether, at the time Shoen published
the allegedly defamatry statements, he may have known they were false or acted with
reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 419 (Leavy, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
131. After the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision, the Shoen brothers'
attorney, stated that "[i]f L.S. Shoen had made a statement to Watkins indicating
he had never believed Uoe and Mark Shoen] had had any connection to the mur-
der, he could make the statement today and it would be of the highest relevance."
Author of Book on U-Haul Family Feud, supra note 65, at A22.
132. Shoen 11, 48 F.3d at 416.
133. Shoen 1, 48 F.3d at 415.
134. Id. at 416.
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plicable in a narrowly defined situation. First, the case must be of a
civil nature; second, the party seeking protection under thejoumal-
ist's privilege must be a nonparty; and third, the requested informa-
tion must be nonconfidential. 135 Outside of this narrowly defined
situation, the Ninth Circuit is likely to revert to its earlier practice of
applying the Farr v. Pitchess case-by-case balancing test.136
When another federal or state court is faced with a discovery
request during a Shoen H!scenario, it has three options in determin-
ing whether to order disclosure. First, it can refuse to adopt the
journalist's privilege and order production of the requested infor-
mation.13 7 Second, it can apply a balancing test to weigh the com-
peting interests of the journalist and the requesting party.'3 8 Third,
the court can adopt a formal, three or four-part test.139
The Ninth Circuit's Shoen I three-part test offers federal courts
an alternative, and arguably less protective, method for determin-
ing whether the journalist's privilege must succumb to the civil liti-
gant's needs. 140 Since the Ninth Circuit decided Shoen II, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals adopted the Shoen II test for civil cases
within its jurisdiction.1 41 Other state and federal courts may choose
to follow the Wisconsin court in adopting the Shoen II test. How-
135. Id. The second element, requiring the journalist to be a nonparty, is
ordinarily met because an "overwhelming majority" of subpoenas are issued
against nonparty journalists. John P. Borger, Resisting Subpoenas for Published or
Broadcast Information, 12 COMM. LAw. 10 & n.1 (1994) (reporting that subpoenas
issued against nonparty journalists accounted for 96.4% of subpoenas reported).
136. For a further discussion of the Farr v. Pitchess balancing test, see supra
notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
137. This is the Sixth Circuit's approach, whereby courts refuse to recognize
the journalist's qualified First Amendment privilege. For a further discussion of
the Sixth Circuit's rejection of the journalist's privilege, see supra note 32 and ac-
companying text.
138. The First, Third and D.C. Circuits apply a balancing test to determine
whether the journalist's privilege should yield to a request for disclosure. For a
further discussion of the balancing approach favored by the First, Third and D.C.
Circuits, see supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
139. For a further discussion of the various formal tests applied by circuit
courts, see supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
140. For a further discussion comparing the Shoen /! test with the Second Cir-
cuit's heightened test, see supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text. However,
some view the Shoen II test as "not significantly different from the showing gener-
ally considered necessary to overcome the privilege when confidential information
is at the heart of the discovery request." Journalist's Privilege - Nonconfidential Infor-
mation-Showing Required to Overcome Privilege, FED. LITIGATOR, July 1995, at 145.
141. Kurzynski v. Spaeth, 538 N.W.2d 554, 559-60 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the Shoen II test to balance the journalist's
interests in a free newsgathering process against a party's need for every person's
evidence. Id. at 559 (citing Shoen /, 48 F.3d at 415-16). For a further discussion of
Kurzynski, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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ever, the apparent inconsistency between the majority's and the dis-
senting judge's application of the test in Shoen II may convince
other courts to continue to follow their own practices, by rejecting
the privilege altogether, by applying a pure balancing standard, or
by applying a formal three or four-part test.142
Kevin J. Baum
142. For a further discussion of the inconsistent application of Shoen II test,
see supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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